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« If you wish to mature your thought, devote yourself to the
study of a great master ; take a system apart, laying bare its
innermost secrets.»
(Émile Durkheim1)
This oft-quoted advice from the great French sociologist was obviously taken
to heart by Philippe Besnard and made his own. Though Durkheim remains best
known for path-breaking substantive contributions to the study of human social
groups, he was himself an inveterate student of the antecedents of sociological
thought. Besnard’s published work is similarly bifurcated. On the one hand, he
established his position as one of the pre-eminent Durkheim scholars of our day
both by making available to the scholarly community incisive commentary on the
founder’s seminal writings and by enlarging our understanding of Durkheim’s
perspective through the discovery and dissemination of a far-ranging body of
academic and personal correspondence. On the other hand, Besnard sought to
apply and extend the master’s insights in empirical works of sociology that retain
a distinctly Durkheimian flavor.
It is this second aspect of Besnard’s scholarly production that I would like to
address here. Though always graced with its author’s own unique style, this work
bears the unmistakable stamp of his mentor, for it typically aims at the identifica-
tion and explication of social facts. These are, of course, the distinctive and irre-
ducible properties of social groups that are made manifest as behaviors requiring
the adoption of a group unit of analysis in order to reveal their true nature.
A prime instance is his exploration of naming practices, Un prénom pour
toujours.2 There is a simple sociological elegance, reminiscent of Durkheim’s classic
works, to the book’s choice of subject. Besnard and Desplanques exploit the
commonplace presumption that the selection of a first name for one’s flesh and blood
(much like the resolve to take one’s own life in the case of Suicide) is an intensely
personal decision expressive of one’s individual nature. In both cases, of course, the
conceit that one’s actions have a claim to uniqueness runs up against the observation
that there are definite patterns, visible only at the level of the social group, that reveal
these freely made individual choices to have been socially determined.
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1 Durkheim’s recommendation to René Maublanc is cited by Steven Lukes in Emile Durkheim: His
Life and Work, New York: Harper and Row, 1977 at p. 54.
2 Philippe Besnard et Guy Desplanques, Un prénom pour toujours: la cote des prénoms, hier,
aujourd’hui et demain. Paris : Balland, 1986.
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EXPLICATION OF A SOCIAL FACT:
SEASONAL VARIATION
IN THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTIONS
I am reminded of Besnard’s inspired choice of topic each fall, when I inspect
lists of students who have enrolled in my current classes. In the contemporary
United States, the increased ethnic diversity is surely the most significant change
that leaps to the attention of anyone who peruses these lists. But a closer exami-
nation reveals another striking trend: the parents of many of these students appear
to have gone to extraordinary lengths to come up with variant and often eccentric
spellings of even the most ordinary first names. It is as if they believed that ortho-
graphical creativity could somehow confer uniqueness and assure the realization
of their most cherished hopes and aspirations for their offspring. Without the
advantage of a group perspective – something that my class lists luckily afford me
– they are unlikely to appreciate that to a sociological observer, the fact that their
whimsy seems so general suggests not the exercise of individuality but the expres-
sion of a generational impulse that is social in its origins.
In just this way, Besnard has showed that the distribution of first names is
highly patterned – is, in fact, subject to cycles whose definite peaks and troughs
reveal that these choices are anything but individualistic acts. The impact of this
demonstration is heightened by the contrast with our everyday understanding of
naming practices as shaped by the idiosyncratic influences that impinge upon the
lives of particular individuals. And when he makes the further point that the
choice of a first name is actually guided by a sensitivity to status concerns or a
desire for economic mobility, the deeply social origins of what we take to be
purely personal choices are placed in sharp relief.
This is just one example of the strong Durkheimian bent in Besnard’s substan-
tive work, and not the one I want to focus on here. But before proceeding, I should
recall to the reader’s mind a few ideas that may hark back to some long-forgotten
class in classical sociological theory, but will serve to introduce the empirical
inquiry that is the nub of what this paper is about.
THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL FACTS
Most sociologists are acquainted with Durkheim’s famous dictum that social
facts can be recognized by two salient properties : exteriority and constraint. He
meant, of course, that they originate outside the individual (even though they may
come to be internalized by properly socialized members of the group); and that
they exert a compelling influence on individuals’ actions (even if social actors are
often unaware of how such forces shape their behavior.) These qualities were for
Durkheim indicative of the power and ubiquity of the social dimension.
But Durkheim pointed to another, less obvious set of properties that are just as
critical to the recognition of social facts : the simultaneous presence of a certain
minimum of both patterning and variability. A case in point was the table of Euro-
pean statistics that was a focus of his argument in Suicide. It showed that while the
rate of self-murder in any one country remained fairly stable over long periods of
time, it varied significantly and consistently from one Continental nation to the
next. It was the pairing of these observations that allowed him to introduce a
remarkable change in perspective. After all, he reasoned, if there were no vari-
ability whatever in the suicide rate, it would effectively be a constant, and there
would be nothing to explain. Conversely, a complete lack of patterning would
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amount to randomness – which also admits of no explanation and is, in fact, the
standard we use to recognize the absence of any causal relationship. It is only
when the social context imposes discernable patterns – which, however, differ
from one group to the next – that we sense we are in the presence of a social fact.
The use of barricades in urban insurrections fulfills these requisites, though in
a different way from suicide rates. When Besnard expressed an interest in data I
had been compiling for a long-term project of research on European forms of
contention, it was easy to see what attracted his attention. The incidence of barri-
cade events over three hundred years of European history is highly uneven. A
straightforward graph of the number of occurrences for each year from 1550 to
1900 would show a scattering of cases in the second half of the sixteenth and the
first half of the seventeenth centuries, followed by their complete absence for well
over a hundred years, and then their reappearance on the eve of the French Revo-
lution. From there, the pace of this kind of insurrectionary activity would accel-
erate through the first half of the nineteenth century – a period that might well be
termed « the age of barricades» – reaching a crescendo around the year 1848.
Although the nineteenth century witnessed the adoption of this technique in
other Continental nations, fully half of all the barricade events I have been able to
identify took place in France. By their very nature, of course, the use of barricades
was all but confined to urban areas, where narrow streets, concentrations of popu-
lation, and the garrisoning of social control forces created the necessary precondi-
tions for this type of confrontation. But one great city – the capital of France,
where barricades were thought to have originated – accounted all unto itself for
twenty-two of one hundred total events3. Indeed, through the first 218 years of
their documented existence, barricades remained a predominantly Parisian and
exclusively French custom. What these few summary statistics confirm is that, in
spatial terms, the barricade was initially a uniquely Gallic innovation that under-
went a process of rapid diffusion to other European countries over the course of
the nineteenth century.
In chronological terms, barricade events have tended to cluster tightly into just
a handful of cyclical peaks. Although instances where insurgents resorted to this
technique of collective action might be considered moderately rare – barricades
have, after all, materialized in just twenty-nine of the three hundred fifty years
covered by my database – when they did make an appearance, it tended to be in
substantial numbers. In truth, a mere six climactic periods of insurrectionary
activity – concentrated within two years on either side of the crucial dates of 1588,
1648, 1789, 1830, 1848, and 1871 – accounted for fully 75% of all European
barricade events I have been able to catalog.
Much of this clumping can be attributed to a few mammoth insurrections that
then precipitated a rash of successor events. The most noteworthy examples were
the February and June Days of 1848, which helped spur dozens of subsequent
outbreaks all across the Continent. As a result, my assertion that three-fourths of
all such insurgency was confined to just six five-year spans between 1550 and
1900 greatly understates the proportion of all barricades that were constructed
3 The next closest contender was Lyon, where eight such events took place. The nearest foreign
rival was Berlin, where four barricade events occurred, all between 1847 and 1849.
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near these peaks, since most of the incidents that fell outside these clusters were
isolated and small-scale events.
To yield a truer picture of the scope and significance of the uprisings with
which barricades have been associated, it is helpful to assign weights to individual
events based upon such considerations as the duration of the event ; the number of
participants involved; a tally of those killed, wounded, or arrested; or an actual
count of how many barricades were erected. Unfortunately, the sources rarely
furnish reliable information on all these variables, so I have had to make
allowance for missing data by constructing a scale that classifies events as
“small,” “medium,” “large,” or “massive” according to an overall assessment of
their magnitude4. By allocating scores to individual events based on a combina-
tion of these factors, it becomes possible to quantify the extent of barricade-
related activity in each calendar year. Because the resulting distribution of yearly
totals is sharply skewed, it is helpful to chart these variations on a log scale (which
eliminates years in which only a single, insignificant event occurred.) The
resulting graph, in which the six major episodes of barricade construction stand
out fairly clearly, is reproduced as Figure 1. Of course, it will not escape anyone
with even a passing familiarity with French history from the early-modern period
forward that the half dozen dates inserted on this chart to denote the apex of the
six principal clusters are also the great landmarks of the insurrectionary tradition
in France, which, since the sixteenth century, has been closely tied to the reper-
toire of barricade construction.
SEASONALITY IN THE RECOURSE TO BARRICADES
These considerations made barricade events a tempting subject for Besnard,
who had a keen eye for the sort of regularity that betokens social facts. In his book
on seasonal patterns, he plotted the number of barricade events – at least the total
of thirty-one I had identified at that time – according to the month in which they
began. The larger and somewhat richer sample of one hundred barricade events
that I now have assembled may make it possible to confirm and even expand upon
Besnard’s initial analysis.
4 A small event (assigned a weight of one) normally began and ended on the same day, involved
twenty or fewer insurgents, resulted in few if any casualties or arrests, and produced one to a few
barricades. A medium event (assigned a weight of two) might extend over one or more days, but
likely involved fewer than 100 participants, no more than ten of whom would typically be killed
or wounded, and the construction of several to a dozen barricades. A large event (assigned a
weight of three) generally lasted longer than a day, but involved no more than a thousand people
and/or a hundred casualties, and generated from a dozen to a hundred barricades. Finally, a
massive event (assigned a weight of four) usually lasted more than a day and engaged more than
a thousand insurgents, at least one hundred of whom were killed or wounded, and the construction
of at least one hundred (and in some cases as may as 2,000) barricades.
I have qualified these descriptions with terms like «generally » or « typically» because details
were often lacking, the various criteria were sometime in conflict, and some indicators (for
example, the number of arrests) applied only to a subset of all events (since insurgents are arrested
only following unsuccessful uprisings.) In such cases, I had to use my best judgment to make
ambiguous historical realities fit my ultimately arbitrary cut-off points.
324 MARK TRAUGOTT
EXPLICATION OF A SOCIAL FACT 325
A simple frequency count of the number of events beginning in each month
of the year is depicted in Figure 2. The earlier 31-event sample is represented by
the lighter vertical bars in the front row; the updated 100-event sample corre-
sponds to the darker set of vertical bars in the back row. Allowing for the differ-
ence in sample size, there is a rough correspondence in the distribution of
events. Besnard’s earlier description of a « spring peak » followed by a more
modest « autumnal mound » holds up rather well in the newer data, although
both crests have shifted a month or two earlier with the inclusion of additional
data points.
Classic explanations for the genesis and timing of major insurrectionary
outbursts have frequently taken cycles of agricultural and economic production
as their point of departure. Among the best known examples in the English-
language literature is George Rudé’s study of the relationship between the timing
of major journées during the French Revolution and the price of bread in Paris5.
He showed that a good many (though by no means all) of the principal crowd
events occurred at junctures when the cost of basic foodstuffs had recently
spiked.
Although Ernest Labrousse never framed his observations in terms of season-
ality, he offered an analysis of major insurrections that seems highly pertinent6.
The outbreak of such events is related to economic disruptions of either of two
types. New-style crises are characteristic of industrial economies and were there-
fore of minor importance during most of the period under scrutiny. Old-style
crises were associated with a collapse of the agricultural sector, which continued
to dominate the economies of France and most other European societies through
much of the nineteenth century. It is this earlier pattern of disorder that mainly
concerns us here.
The associations to which Rudé pointed – linking calamitous harvests, rising
grain prices, and popular protest – make great intuitive sense. To this picture,
Labrousse has added a model of how dislocation in the agricultural sector trans-
mits and intensifies the hardships that are ultimately suffered by the urban
working class. The mechanism works something like this : first, the need to import
foreign grain at inflated prices depletes reserves of precious metals and creates a
liquidity crisis. Lack of liquidity soon translates into a financial and credit crisis
that hits the industrial sector especially hard and causes marginal enterprises to
fail. Meanwhile, because so much larger a share of most people’s disposable
income must be allocated to the purchase of increasingly costly foodstuffs,
demand for the goods produced by the urban economy is drastically reduced.
Producers large and small are forced to make dramatic cutbacks in their work
force, and an employment crisis quickly looms. Workers, caught between a
rapidly rising cost of living and the inability to find jobs, are driven to desperation
– with predictable consequences for the level of civil conflict.
5 See George Rudé, The Crowd in the French Revolution. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
6 See Ernest Labrousse, «1848-1830-1789: comment naissent les revolutions,» pp. 1-29 in Comité
français des sciences historiques, Actes du congrès historique du centenaire de la revolution de
1848, Paris : Presses Univérsitaires de France, 1948; and « Panoramas de la Crise,» pp. iii-xxiv in
Ernest Labrousse, ed., Aspects de la crise et de la depression de l’économie française au milieu du
19e siècle, 1846-1851, La Roche-sur-Yon: Imprimerie Centrale de l’Ouest, 1956.
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Do either of these models help explain the pattern observed in Figure 2? A
definitive answer based on Rudé’s work would probably require comparing levels
of unrest with the price of bread compiled over a centuries-long period of time, an
investigation that lies far beyond the scope of the modest exercise undertaken
here. But Lefebvre’s analysis, with its particular stress on a linked series of mini-
crises separated by lags of varying duration, is certainly suggestive. It helps us to
understand why the primary concentration of events should occur in late spring or
early summer, as meager stocks of grain are eventually exhausted (since the final
months preceding the new harvest are always the hardest.) It may also help
account for the lesser peak that follows a few months later, since the primary
perturbations in the agrarian sector take some time to percolate into other areas of
the economy and produce secondary shocks.
Labrousse makes it quite clear that the revolutions of 1848 still conformed to
the standard old-style pattern of agriculture-driven crises7. But if he is correct
about the shift that occurred in the etiology of insurrection as European economies
underwent industrialization, then one might hope to catch a glimpse of a different
configuration of forces in the second half of the nineteenth century. The limita-
tions of my data set only permit me to compare events dating from before and after
the year 1850 to see if any damping of the twin peaks in the monthly distribution
of insurrections became evident as the century wore on8.
Unfortunately, the number of French events – arrayed in Figure 3 to show the
earlier events in the back row, and the later ones in front – is too small and the
resulting distribution too fragmentary to make a convincing case for such a
change. Perhaps the progress of industrialization – a process that remained
incomplete through the very end of the nineteenth century in France – was just
too slow for its impact to show up before the turn of the new century. We also
need to keep in mind that a maturing industrial economy effected changes in the
fabric of society – notably the decline of the stratum of skilled artisans respon-
sible for much of the revolutionary action with which barricades had been asso-
ciated.
But there is another hypothesis that should be given serious consideration until
a more satisfactory empirical test of the Labroussian proposition can be devised.
In so far as the seasonality of pre-1850 events constituted a social fact – a property
of the social group, rooted in everyday practices and common understandings – it
might be expected to exhibit the sort of stubborn resistance to change that we
associate with other culturally rooted phenomena. Labrousse is undoubtedly
correct that new-style crises would eventually supplant the older pattern, but with
a lag that the simple change in economic arrangements is unable to account for all
on its own. The remarkable degree of continuity exhibited by the French in the
7 Whether one considers that the potato blight responsible for famine in cool-weather regions like
Ireland converged with the ruinous wheat harvests that affected much of the rest of Europe in 1845
and 1846, there can be little doubt concerning the importance of agricultural crises in the genesis
of the many uprisings of the late 1840s. Indeed, the simultaneity and scope of subsistence crises is
obviously helpful in explaining the vast scale of revolutionary upheaval in 1848.
8 Moreover, since my inventory of barricade events ends with the year 1900, I have confined this
particular analysis to France, since in most other Continental nations the industrial transformation
(and therefore the incidence of new-style crises) would have occurred still later.
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seasonality as well as the form of insurrectionary activity suggests the power and
durability of group influences, a notion to which I suspect both Durkheim and
Besnard would readily have subscribed.
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